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THE ORGANIZATION AS WEAPON IN 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMEt 
Stanton Wheeler* 
Mitchell Lewis Rothman** 
Edwin Sutherland originated the phrase "white-collar crime" in 
his presidential address to the American Sociological Society in De-
cember 1939, 1 but scholarly consideration of the subject precedes 
that date considerably. In 1907, while the muckrakers were publiciz-
ing corporate misbehavior for the masses, Edward Alsworth Ross 
published academic sociology's first treatment of what we today la-
bel white-collar crime. His Sin and Society argued that a new crimi- · 
nal was at large, one ''who picks pockets with a railway rebate, 
murders with an adulterant instead of a bludgeon, burglarize~ with a 
'rake-off' instead of. a jimmy, cheats with a company prospectus in-
stead of a deck of cards, or scuttles his town instead of his ship2-in 
short, one whose crimes were committed on behalf, or with the 
assistance, of a business corporation. 
Like Ross, Sutherland wrote primarily of corporate illegality; his 
study of offenses committed by seventy of the nation's industrial 
leaders, presented at length in White Collar Crime, 3 informed all his 
work.4 Sutherland's most widely accepted definition of white-collar 
t With compliments for unwittingly suggesting the title: Philip Selznick "(The 
Organizational Weapon) and Frank Zimring ("The Medium Is the Message: Firearm Caliber 
as a Determinant of the Death Rate From Assault") 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 97 (1972). This work is 
supported by Grant #78-NI-AX-0017 from the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department 
of Justice. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the Department of Justice. We are 
extremely indebted to two principal collaborators on the white-collar crime project, Nancy 
Bode and David Weisburd, who were responsible for much of the original data collection and 
analysis. We would also like to thank Jack Katz, Reinier Kraakman, WoQdy Powell, and 
Albert J. Reiss, Jr. for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
* Professor of Law and Sociology, Yale University. B.A. 1952, Pomona College; M.A. 
1956, Ph.D. 1958, University of Washington. 
** B.A. 1969, Queens College; J.D. 1974, Ph.D. 1982, Yale University. Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, Hamline University. 
1. Published the following year as Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality. 5 AM. Soc. REv. 
1 (1940). Sutherland had used the phrase ''white-collar criminaloids" in the second and third 
editions of his text, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (1934, 1939). 
2. E. Ross, SIN AND SOCIETY ~ (1907). 
3. E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1949). 
4. See Crime of Corporations, in THE SUTHERLAND PAPERS 78-96 (A. Cohen, A, 
Lindesmith & K. Schuessler eds. 1956); The White-Collar Criminal, in Encyclopedia of Crimi-
nology 511-15 (V. Branham & S. Kutash eds. 1949); Is "White-Collar Crime" Crime?, 10 AM. 
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crime, however, said nothing at all regarding corporate or organiza-
tional conduct. Instead, it spoke of status and occupation, grafting 
new themes to sociology's traditional concern for corporate excess: 
"White-collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime com-
mitted by a person of respectability and high social status in the 
course of his occupation."5 
Though important, the link between social status and white-col-
lar crime is not immediately relevant. What is significant is how def-
erence to a requirement that the white-collar criminal act "in the 
course of his occupation" and the notion that white-collar crime is 
inherently organizational have been sources of ambiguity and confu-
sion in the literature since Sutherland's death. Two influential 
works, Clinard's6 and Hartung's7 research on black market activities 
during World War II, are revealing in this regard. Both studied the 
crimes of businesspeople, Both suggested that white-collar crime re-
ferred only to such conduct. But for Clinard, white-collar crime 
meant only "illegal activities among business and professional 
men,"8 while Hartung viewed it as "a violation of law regulating 
business, which is committed for a firm by the firm or its agents in 
the conduct of its business."9 
This tension between one view of white-collar crime focusing on 
occupation and another emphasizing organization was not soon re-
solved. During the 1960s and early 1970s, researchers either viewed 
occupational and organizational illegality as distinct forms of crimi-
nal behavior, or described corporate offenses as a subset of occupa-
tional illegality. Reflecting the first point of view, for example, a 
leading text presented separate chapters on occupational and corpo-
rate offenses. Occupational crimes, it stated, include those "commit-
ted by individuals for the~selves in the course of their occupations 
and the offenses of employees aga~st employers"; corporate offenses 
were those "committed by corporate officials for their corporation 
and the offenses of the corporation itself."10 But these were distinc-
tions without a difference. How is one to determine when crimes are 
committed "for the corporation" or by "the corporation itself'? In-
Soc. REV. 132 (1945); White-Collar Criminality, supra note l; Crime and Business, 217 ANNALS 
112 (1941). 
5. E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 3, at 9 (footnote omitted). 
6. See M. CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET (1952); Clinard, Criminological Theories of Vio-
lations of Wartime Regulations, ll AM. Soc. REv. 258 (1946). 
7. Hartung, White-Collar Offenses in tire Wholesale Meat Industry in ./Jelroit, 56 AM. J. Soc. 
25 (1950). 
8. M. CLINARD, supra note 6, at viii. 
9. Hartung, supra note 7, at 25 (footnote omitted). 
10. M. CLINARD & R. QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS 188 (2d ed, 1973). 
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eluding organizational offenses within a larger category called occu-
pational crime, as some writers have done, does not make the line 
between the two any easier to draw. I I 
Previous work has tried to distinguish individual and organiza-
tional illegality in two ways. One approach focuses on benefit: 
Either the individual gains at the organization's expense, as in em-
bezzlement, or the organization profits regardless of individual ad-
vantage, as in price fixing. 12 But individuals and their organizations 
often reap mutual advantage from criminal conduct. What happens, 
for example, when white-collar crimes are committed by the princi-
pals of small business firms? In such instances, it may be misleading 
to speak of separate individual and organizational identities; motive 
may reflect individual as well as organizational interests. 
The second approach asks whether criminal behavior furthers or-
ganizational goals. I3 Again, we run into difficulties. Stated objec-
tives may not correspond to organizational reality, and groups 
within a firm may favor widely divergent aims. In an analysis devel-
oped for other purposes, Enµann and Lundman have suggested that 
information concerning organizational norms, socialization patterns 
within the enterprise, and executive knowledge of subordinates' ac-
tivities are all required before wrongdoing can be classified as indi-
vidual or organizational. I4 It is often difficult, of course, to obtain 
such data. 
The recent explosion of interest in white-collar illegality has not 
greatly changed matters. Scholars have concentrated on corporate 
crime and given less attention to illicit occupational behavior, but it 
is still not clear whether research refers specifically to organizational 
or occupational offenses or to some combination of these phenom-
ena. That the two categories might overlap is often ignored; after all, 
those who act on behalf of an organization generally do so in an 
occupational role. On the other hand, occupation inplies employ-
ment and in our society most employment occurs within an organi-
zation. Unfortunately, no one has specified what difference it makes 
I I. See Clarke, White-Collar Crime, Occupational Crime, and Legitimacy, 6 INTL. J. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & PENOLOGY 121 (1978); Hornung, Blue-Collar Theft: Conceptions of Property, Atti-
tudes Toward Pilfering, and Work Group Norms in a Modem Industrial Plant, in CRIMES 
AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 46, 47 (E. Smigel & H. Ross eds. 1970). 
12. H. BLOCH & G. GEIS, MAN, CRIME, AND SOCIETY (1962); M. CLINARD & R. QUINNEY, 
supra note 10, and Hartung, supra note 7, have all employed this distinction. 
13. See Schrager & Short, Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 Soc. PROBS. 
407 (1978); Shapiro, Thinking About White-Collar Crime: Matters of Conceptualization and Re-
search, in REsEARCH ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (National Institute of Justice, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice) 1980. 
14. Ermann & Lundman, JJeviant Acts by Complex Organizations: JJeviance and Social 
Control at the Organizational Level of Am:lysis, 19 Soc. Q. 55 (1978). 
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when a crime is committed under the cover of an organization or in 
some occupational context. And social scientists and legal scholars 
have referred only to the largest, for-profit corporations in describing 
- and decrying - the consequences of organizational wrongdoing. 
This Article explores the advantages of using organization or oc-
cupation in the more typical case. Our inquiry takes this as its cen-
tral question: What difference does it make when a white-collar 
crime is committed in the course of one's occupation or when acting 
on behalf, or with the assistance, of an organization? If we are be-
coming, as some have argued, an organizational society, 15 then we 
should see the results of this change reflected in illicit as well as licit 
behavior. The organizational form may be used for either social or 
antisocial ends. Our principal hypothesis, as the title suggests, is that 
the organization, size and profitability notwithstanding, is for white-
collar criminals what the gun or knife is for the common criminal -
a tool to obtain money from victims. 16 
I. DESIGN OF THE INQUIRY 
Our work was part of a broader program of research on white-
collar illegality.17 Specifically, our data were drawn from a study 
assessing differentials in the sentencing of white-collar offenders, 
which had collected presentence investigation reports (PSis) for per-
sons convicted during fiscal years 1976, 1977, and 1978 of eight pre-
sumptively white-collar crimes prosecuted in the federal courts: 
15. Our society is an organizational society. We are born in organizations, educated by 
organizations, and most of us spend much of our lives working for organizations. We 
spend much of our leisure time paying, playing, and praying in organizations. Most of us 
will die in an organization, and when the time comes for burial, the largest organization of 
all-the state - must grant official permission. 
A. ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS I (1964) (footnote omitted). The phrase itself is drawn 
from the larger discussion in R. PRESTHUS, THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY (1962). 
For Perrow, the word "organization" no longer qualifies "society" - organizations are 
society. In our "society of organizations," the organization is "the only game in town," the 
locus of "almost all human needs, including the numerous ones it has managed to create." 
Today, virtually all that is human is created in or defined in terms of its association with 
organizations. Organization Theory in a Society of Organizations (1979) (paper delivered at 
the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston). 
16. The organizational advantage should obtain when not-for-profits step over the line, 
too. But our data so infrequently include the activity of not-for-profit organizations that we 
are loathe to generalize about such conduct. Nevertheless, we use both "corporate" and "orga-
nizational" (and related forms of these words) throughout to connote phenomena more univer-
sal than those occurring only in for-profit, commercial contexts. 
17. Books published so far in this program include W.M. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES (1979), 
ands. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978). Another 
six studies will be forthcoming from Yale University Press as they reach completion. They will 
include monographs on self-dealing in the corporation, detection of illegalities by the SEC, 
federal prosecution of white-collar crime, legal defense of white-collar defendants, and two 
studies of sentencing of white-collar offenders. 
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antitrust violations, securities fraud, postal and wire fraud, false 
claims and statements, credit and lending institution fraud, bank em-
bezzlement, tax evasion, and bribery. This sentencing project had 
studied as many as thirty cases per offense in each of seven federal 
districts18 for six of the categories of crimes, and a national sample of 
antitrust and securities cases. 
Prepared by federal probation officers, the PSI is the basic docu-
ment used by the court at sentencing.19 For cases that have not gone 
to trial ( eighty-two percent of those in our sample), the PSI is often 
the only source of information regarding offense and offender avail-
able to the judge. That presentence reports are completed for only a 
few of those who actually commit illegal acts is, of course, signifi-
cant. Criminal activity not discovered or reported to authorities was 
not in the sentencing project's sample .. Neither was conduct that did 
not result in indictment or, eventually, a finding of guilt. The cases 
examined were thus not representative of even the eight federal 
crimes under scrutiny.2° Consider, for example, the effect of 
prosecutorial decisions on case selection. It has been suggested the 
results reported below in part reflect features of the enforcement pro-
cess; organizational crimes, it is said, are difficult to prove, and pros-
ecutors make the unusual investigative effort required to document 
organizational illegality only when wrongdoing is prominent 
enough, in terms of structure, duration, victimization, and the like, to 
warrant massive investment of time and other resources. Less conse-
quential misbehavior simply isn't "worth it." We disagree with that 
argument, and shall return to the issue after presenting our own :find-
ings, but we do think it worth keeping such possibilities in mind as 
the data are reviewed. 
Because it provides descriptions of the nature of the crime and 
the context in which it was carried out, the PSI permitted the identi-
fication of offenses committed by individuals, those committed by 
individuals who used an occupational role or position, and those ac-
complished through some form of organization. Our defendants fell 
18. The districts (and their central cities) include Central California (Los Angeles), North-
ern Georgia (Atlanta), Northern Illinois (Chicago), Maryland, Southern New York (Manhat-
tan and the Bronx), Northern Texas (Dallas), and Western Washington (Seattle). 
19. Rule 32(c)(l) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a presentence inves-
tigation report to be made out on all convicted offenders prior to sentence unless, with the 
court's permission, the defendant waives the report, or the court finds sufficient information in 
the record to sentence the offender. Approximately six percent of our potential sample cases 
had no PSI. As a condition of receiving these confidential documents, we agreed with proba-
tion authorities to establish procedures to insure confidentiality of personal information. 
20. Much less behavior was prosecuted in other statutory categories or in state courts. 
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into the six categories shown in table 1.21 
Table 1 
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A Jy_pology of White-Collar Offenders 
Offense 
committed by: 
A Single Individual 
A Group of Affiliated Individuals 
Through Use of a Formal Organization 
Use of an Occupational 
Role or Position 
NO YES 
Cell I Cell 4 
Cell 2 Cell 5 
Cell 3 Cell 6 
The presentence reports were completed for individual defen-
dants.22 Though we refer throughout to occupational and organiza-
tional crimes, it is perhaps more accurate to say that we are really 
concerned with the benefits accruing to individuals as a result of the 
use of occupation and organization. We have already indicated that 
differentiating between individual, occupational, and organizational 
offenses is not an easy conceptual matter. It is often not possible to 
separate individual and organizational gain neatly, or to distinguish 
the influence of occupational role and organization on criminal ac-
tivity when persons are operating in complex social environments, 
and we make no attempt to do so here. , 
After a preliminary examination of the data, we made two 
changes in order to simplify the presentation here. First, we col-
lapsed the distinction between individuals operating alone ( cell 1) 
and individuals acting with affiliated persons (cell 2). As we antici-
pated, on most items the category of "affiliated individuals" falls be-
tween lone defendants on the one hand, and those using an 
organizational position on the other. But since there is not much 
difference between "affiliated individuals" and lone offenders, and 
21. Two items from our coding scheme were used to establish the three fold typology de-
scribed below. One item asked: "Which of the following comes closest to describing the level 
of organization of the actual offense?" The three relevant categories turned on whether the 
offense was committed by a single individual, by two or more affiliated persons, or "through an 
organized association, business organization, partnership or family business." The second cat-
egory indicated use of the combined personal resources of several individuals working in an 
informal group; the third marked the defendant's mobilization of the resources of a formal 
organization. The second item used to construct the typology asked: "What role did the de-
fendant's occupational situation play in the offense?" Although the coding scheme allowed for 
a variety of modes of use, we distinguished simply between those in which the defendant's 
occupational situation played no role and those in which it played some part - permitting 
access to documents or information, the use of a position of authority or business identity to 
victimize others, and the like. 
22. Because it was particularly interested in the decision to incarcerate, the sentencing pro-
gram did not focus specifically on indicted organizations. In fact, with the exception of anti-
trust, where corporations are routinely named, organizational indictments occur only 
infrequently in these statutory categories. 
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the number of cases in the affiliated category was about half the 
other, we saw no reason to separate rigorously the two in this paper. 
The second major simplification pertains to cell 3: individuals 
who use organization, but not occupation. This Article will not dis-
cuss these cases. This cell was by far the smallest, comprising less 
than four percent of the sample. We considered joining these cases 
with cell 6, or with the now united cells 1 and 2, but after inspecting 
the cases decided not to, for they seemed to fall into distinct types 
and did not allow for easy combination. 23 
We have, then, three principal categories of offenders: those who 
committed offenses alone or with affiliated others using neither occu-
pational nor organizational role (individual offenders); those who 
committed offenses alone or with affiliated others using an occupa-
tional role (occupational offenders); and those who committed of-
fenses in which both organization and occupation were ingredients 
(organizational offenders).24 Note again that we did not distinguish 
occupational and organizational crimes. Rather, we considered oc-
cupation and organization as attributes that may - or may not -
appear in a given instance. Note, too, that our organizational crimes 
need not be the result of corporate misadventure (though most of the 
organizational illegality reported below was committed by, or on be-
half of, for-profit business organizations). We expected that crimes 
committed within an occupational role would differ from crimes that 
were not, and that crimes committed with ·the assistance of both oc-
cupation and organization would be different still. By drawing on 
data collected by the sentencing project regarding the nature, conse-
quences, and processing of white-collar illegality, and the personal 
and social characteristics of convicted white-collar felons, we hope to 
demonstrate how such differences are manifested. · 
23. Nearly one half of these cases represented instances of tax evasion, where either an 
employer failed to remit taxes withheld from workers' paychecks, or self-employed persons did 
not report business income on their personal returns. The second largest category in the cell 
included cases of fraud where defendants operated in shell or other alleged corporations. 
24. The face validity of this measure - how well it reflects distinctive occupational and 
organizational qualities -is suggested by its relation to two other indicators oflevel of organi-
zation used in our study. We asked whether an offense occurred once, on a number of separate 
occasions, on separate occasions, but as part of one overarching plan, or whether it had one 
cumulative effect. As expected, this variable is strongly related to organizational type: Of the 
offenses occurring only once or on a number of separate occasions, about one half were indi-
vidual offenses (compared to 36% for the total sample). Of those that involved an overarching 
plan or added up to one cumulative effect, about one half were committed through an organi-
zation, compared to 35% for the total sample. Similarly, we coded the data to determine 
whether an offense involved one level of organization, two levels of organization, or three or 
more levels. Seventy-seven percent of the individual or affiliated individual cases involved one 
level only, in contrast to less than 25% of those where both occupational and organizational 
roles were present 
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One final methodological note before we present our results. By 
combining defendants convicted of different statutory offenses, we 
necessarily neglected features that were offense-specific. Within our 
sample, for example, most bank embezzlers were individual offend-
ers using an occupational position, and most tax offenders were indi-
. viduals who had neither occupational nor organizational "cover." 
At the same time, both an organizational and occupational role were 
involved in all the antitrust cases and most of the SEC cases. Thus, 
we might attribute to the "organizational" dimension something that 
is specific only to a particular offense such as SEC fraud or antitrust, 
to the "occupational" dimension something specific to embezzle-
ment, and to the "individual" offenses something peculiar to tax 
fraud. To minimize this potential for distortion, we examined the 
relationships reported below both for the total sample, and for the 
four offenses - mail fraud, bribery, credit and lending institution 
fraud, and false claims and statements - that were spread fairly 
evenly across our three offender categories.25 We found that the re-
lationships discovered in the full sample were virtually the same in 
direction, though somewhat smaller in magnitude (typically about 
half as strong), in the four-offense subset. We feel confident, there-
fore, that we are describing genuine effects of organizational and oc-
cupational role and not traits uniquely explained by a particular type 
of offense. In what follows, we will present results for the total sam-
ple, and will add necessary detail with regard to the subset if it ap-
pears that not doing so would distort the true picture. 
II. RESULTS 
A. The Nature of the Illegality 
We explored the nature of illegal behavior in our sample by us-
ing two different kinds of indicator: The first are "ecological" meas-
ures describing the frequency, duration, and geographic spread of 
the offense. As the top portion of Table 2 shows, occupational and 
organizational offenders break the law more often before they are 
caught than do individual off enders. The differences are even 
clearer for our subset of four off enses.26 
25. Each of these offenses has at least one fifth, and no more than one third, of its cases in 
each of the three categories. 
26. Measurement of the number of acts may understate actual differences. For example, 
one price-fixing scheme was counted as a single act, even though dozens of overt acts in fur-
therance of the conspiracy might have occurred, or thousands of transactions with consumers 
taken place as a result. Similarly, a mail fraud scheme in which fifty orders were sent out in 
two mailings was coded as two acts, rather than one hundred. Recording numbers of discrete 
acts must to some extent remain problematic when offenses, themselves so different, can be 
conceptualized in various ways. 
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Table 2 
Number ef Times the Illegality was Completed 
All Offenses 
1411 
Number of Cases Mean Number of Times 
I. Individual Offenders 
II. Occupational Offenders 
III. Organizational Offenders 
The Subset of Four Offenses 
I. Individual Offenders 
II. Occupational Offenders 













With respect to the duration of the offense (the length of time 
between the first act and the last), however, Table 3 reveals a sub-
stantial difference when we contrast the total sample with the more 
restricted set of four; results in the full complement of eight reflected 
the extreme length of most antitrust and SEC offenses (approxi-
mately five and three years, respectively). The longer duration for 
individual offenders and the shorter one for occupational criminals 
in the full sample are largely explained by the relatively prolonged 
nature of tax fraud, an individual crime, and by the comparative 
brevity of embezzlement, which is occupational. But the general 
pattern is very clear: Offenses committed in an organization's name 
occurred more frequently, and over a longer period of time, than 
those where an organizational element was lacking. 
Table 3 
.Duration ef the Offense 
All Offenses 
I. Individual Offenders 
II. Occupational Offenders 
III. Organizational Offenders 
The Subset of Four Offenses 
I. Individual Offenders 
IL Occupational Offenders 
III. Organizational Offenders 







A similar picture emerges when we examine geographic spread. 
As Table 4 indicates, individual or occupational delicts are rarely 
felt outside the local area. Corporate offenses, however, are very 
likely to have effects spread far and wide. Individual and occupa-
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tional defendants may be distinguished at lower levels; those who 
use an occupational identity are more likely to affect at least a local 
area, not just immediate participants. 
Table 4 
The Geographic Spread of the Offense 
Individual Occupational Organizational 
Offenders Offenders Offenders Total 
Immediate Participants 317 . 174 96 587 
Only (73.7%) (52.1%) (24.9%) 
Local 76 131 75 282 
(17.7%) (39.2%) (19.4%) 
State or Regional 13 11 92 116 
(3.0%) (3.3%) (23.8%) 
National or International 24 18 123 165 
(5.6%) (5.4%) (31.9%) 
Total 430 334 386 I 150 
The second group of indicators used to analyze the sample was 
more qualitative in nature. Three measures were employed to assess 
the complexity and sophistication of the crime.. The first asked 
whether documents were created or manipulated during the offense 
to substantiate a false statement. Such activity is clearly linked to 
offense type: this occurred in a third of the individual cases, just 
over half of the occupational cases, and seventy percent of the 
organizational crimes. A pattern is less evident when the frequency 
of a "cover up" is examined.27 Fewer than one fifth of the solo of-
fenders tried to hide what they had done; thirty percent of both the 
occupational and organizational defendants did so. Finally, the sen-
tencing project's coders rated offense sophistication directly (if im-
pressionistically). A one to four scale reflected whether illegal 
conduct was very, somewhat, not very, or not at all sophisticated. 
The mean rating for organizational wrongs was 1.9; for occupational 
crimes, 2.6; and for those conducted by lone men and women, 3.0. 
The various indicators thus yield a relatively clear picture. While 
crimes committed in an occupational capacity are "larger'' in some 
sense than those conducted outside such roles, the most dramatic ef-
fects are realized when occupational and organizational identities 
combine. This is quite consistent with other findings in our general 
research program which emphasize the ability to "hide" an offense 
within the interstices of organization and through elusive manipula-
27. The presence of cover-up activity was ascertained by asking, "Did the defendant em-
ploy methods to avoid or delay discovery of a previously committed illegality?" 
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tion of paper, making it easier for relatively sophisticated crimes to 
continue undetected for a longer period and to occur with greater 
frequency.28 
B. The Economic and Social Consequences of Illegality 
The above results suggest patterned differences in the nature of 
the offenses undertaken by our three types of offender. We cannot, 
however, conclude from that evidence that the consequences of such 
acts are sharply different. For that we need evidence on the magni-
tude of the offense. In the course of our inquiry, we gathered from 
the PSI as much data as we could concerning the actual magnitude 
of the illegality in question - the "take," as measured in dollars. 
That information was often missing, particularly when, as in the 
more complicated mail and stock frauds and antitrust cases, the 
large number of victims made it very difficult to estimate total loss. 
The available data may, therefore, be biased in the direction oflesser 
amounts because we did not have full reporting in all instances. 
That the amount of loss is typically reported by either victims or 
governmental officials may compensate; both may have an interest in 
exaggerating offense magnitude. In any event, we regard the data 
presented below as crude, but think they are clearly adequate to 
show the main direction of the effect of organization, if not the 
precise degree of that effect. 29 
Because we believe the results are both interesting and important, 
and because we think different modes of presentation might lead to 
different conclusions, we present in Table 5 data for all of the sur-
veyed offenses, as well as for the subset of four crimes. We also re-
port separately the arithmetic mean, which heightens the significance 
of the very largest wrongs, and the median, ·or the case that lies pre-
cisely in the middle of the offense distribution. Indeed, because the 
means are so heavily skewed, we think that the medians convey the 
results most clearly. We also think it prudent to focus on the subset 
of four offenses, thus removing the particular effects of tax, bank em-
bezzlement, SEC fraud, and antitrust cases. This leaves cases more 
evenly distributed across the four remaining crime categories. 
28. See Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and 
Common Crimes, 13 LAW & Soc. REV. 431 (1979) (the complexity of white-collar crimes forces 
prosecutors to take more active roles in the investigation process). 
29. Even where the data were available, the coding was not unambiguous. With bribery, 
for example, we coded the amount of the bribe or kickback, not the more speculative amount 
of the profit that might be gained as a result of the bribe. In income tax cases we coded the 
amount owed the IRS. For lending and credit institution frauds we coded the amount ofloans 
applied for. For unsuccessful offenses (a very small portion of the total) we coded the amount 
that would have been taken had the crime been successful. 




Number of Cases Median Take Mean Take 
I. Individual Offenders 316 $7,623 $74,585 
II. Occupational Offenders 269 $8,018 $135,01 I 
III. Organizational Offenders 221 $387,274 $1,077,432 
The Subset of Four Offenses 
I. Individual Offenders 206 $5,279 $73,616 
II. Occupational Offenders 92 $17,106 $218,351 
III. Organizational Offenders 96 $117,392 $612,305 
Using either measure and in either sample, the results are stark 
and unmistakable. To begin, the median take for individual offend-
ers in our subset of four offenses was a little over $5,000. Those op-
erating within the context of an occupational role netted 
approximately three times as much-a bit over $17,000. If offenders 
used both occupation and organization to commit their offense, the 
take was about twenty times that in cases where they operated with-
out such assistance. The corresponding median for all off enders was 
higher for individuals, reflecting primarily the addition of tax frauds 
(whose median was $21,668); for occupational offenders it was only 
half as much as the median for the subset of four offenses (reflecting 
the addition of bank embezzlers, whose median take was but $3,410.) 
The median for organizational off enders, which was nearly three and 
a half times the median in the subset of four, resulted from the addi-
tion to the sample of complex SEC frauds and the very few antitrust 
offenses where dollar magnitude data were available. 
The mean take for individual crimes in our four offense subset 
was almost $75,000, or about four times the median magnitude. The 
distribution was extremely skewed; a small number of cases involved 
gargantuan amounts. Jo 
The mean value of a crime committed organizationally exceeded 
a million dollars. This contrasts with a little over half that much 
($612,305) for our subset of four. As with the median, this di.ff erence 
largely reflects the presence of the SEC cases. The median take for 
persons convicted of SEC fraud was almost half a million dollars 
($492,601). Twenty percent of these cases were in the $2.5 million 
30. The largest category in our magnitude coding system was $2.5 million and over. We 
do not know the distribution of the cases in this sub-category. In calculating mean take, we 
used $3 million as a conservative el!timate for all such cases. Average magnitude in that cate-
gory is probably somewhat larger. And this effect is present, of course, primarily for organiza-
tional offenses. Thus, we again feel the very large gap between the organizational and 
individual defendants probably understates the actual difference. 
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and above category. And while data were available on only fourteen 
percent of antitrust violations surveyed, twelve of those six.teen cases 
were in the $2.5 million-plus category, and the other four were worth 
over half a million dollars. 
These data, though crude, point to the enormous advantage ac-
cruing to those who use formal organization. But the results might 
be due to other variables that are correlated with the organizational 
dimension. Can anything be said regarding the effect of organiza-
tion on offense magnitude when other, arguably relevant, factors are 
held constant? We employed ordinary least squares regression to 
address the problem from this perspective. 
We first considered variables that measured offense-specific char-
acteristics, such as statutory category, frequency and duration, geo-
graphic spread, complexity, sophistication, and the defendant's use 
of an occupational role. Our attention next turned to off ender traits, 
including the defendant's age, sex, race, level of education, arrest 
record, position within employing organization (whether or not such 
position was used to further the crime, or the organization was in-
volved in illegal activity), occupational status, and "impeccability" 
or general community standing.31 A ''best" model, reflecting attri-
butes of both offense and offender - one which most accurately pre-
dicted offense size on the basis of such information - was estimated 
in this fashion. 
Of the variables describing offense characteristics, duration, geo-
graphic spread, complexity, and sophistication were consistently sig-
nificant at the very low alpha levels (p=.0001); a group of dummy 
variables representing crime categories were also statistically signifi-
cant. The frequency of illegal acts and the defendant's use of an 
occupational position, however, were not. Of the offender traits, age, 
race, education, and prior record were found unimportant, but sex 
did prove a significant predictor of offense magnitude. This is per-
haps misleading, given our sample; a large number of our female 
defendants were relatively lowly placed bank tellers convicted of em-
bezzlement.32 Sex was therefore an offense-specific measure of sta-
31. For the occupational prestige ratings, see Duncan, A Socio-Economic Index far All Oc-
cupations, in OCCUPATIONS & Soc. STATUS 109 (A. Reiss, Jr. ed. 1961). "Impeccability" was a 
composite of 29 background variables generally included in the presentence reports. These 
described early family life, academic performance, military and employment history, present 
living arrangements, religious attendance, group affiliations, involvement with drugs and alco-
hol, and community reputation. 
32. 15.6% of the sample's defendants were women; nearly half of these women (47.6%) 
were convicted of bank embezzlement, and only one of those held a position higher than teller 
or clerk. Ninety percent of all female defendants held nonmanagement jobs of that general 
rank. 
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tus as much as an indicator of valid gender-related differences in 
criminal activity. 
Position in firm was the most important of the more obvious 
measures of social standing; one's company rank was always highly 
significant, whether or not occupational prestige or impeccability 
were also included in the model being tested. Prestige and impecca-
bility were significant when each was alone in the equation, insignifi-
cant when position in firm was also present. 
The best model in hand, a dummy variable reflecting whether the 
crime in question had been conducted through or with the assistance 
of a formal organization was added to this already-developed equa-
tion - to see if the fact of organization made any difference in of-
fense magnitude, once other significantly related factors had been 
taken into account. Table 6 shows what happened: without dis-
turbing the significance of factors already identified as material 
predictors of offense size, organization was also found statistically 
significant. The result lends considerable support to the conclusion 
we drew from Table 5 - the organization contributes in a very im-
portant way to the profits of white-collar crime.33 
33. The organization variable was also added to equations in which occupational status 
and impeccability replaced position in firm. In the first instance, organization was significant 
at the p=.003 level; in the second, at p=.0002. 
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A similar analysis was undertaken for our subset of four offenses. 
Though the results were largely the same, certain problems cloud 
interpretation. The defendant's use of an occupational role to effect 
or facilitate criminal activity was statistically significant; sex no 
longer was. While the variables describing the defendant's status 
were, in general, much less important, variation across judicial dis-
tricts was now significant.34 Unfortunately, organization and the use 
of occupational role were too closely correlated in this subsample for 
us to weigh accurately the separate effects of each on offense magni-
tude. There are simply too many cases in which both organization 
and occupation are used for the regression technique to distinguish 
their respective contributions. When organization and occupation 
are introduced independently into a "core" model containing dura-
tion, geographic spread, complexity, and sophistication, they are 
both statistically significant.35 When they appear together, only oc-
cupation is significant at the traditional p=.05 level (organization is 
significant at p=.08) - but given the nature of the cases we are stud-
ying, this statistical result cannot be taken to suggest substantive im-
portance or the lack of same. 
Why the organizational edge? Organizations, of course, operate 
on a grander scale than mere individuals. This difference can be 
illustrated most clearly by an example. In one case, an individual 
applied to the same bank for both a personal an4 business loan, of-
fering phony personal tax returns as proof of his financial standing. 
The personal loan was for $10,000; the corporate loan was for 
$150,000. Neither was repaid. 
A second loan case points to the same conclusion. Represented 
by its president, a corporation entered into a fact<;>ring agreement 
with a leading New York commercial bank, presenting it with $1.2 
million in false billings over the course of seven months; the com-
pany's statements were either inflated to reflect much more business 
than was actually being done, or were simply made up. Would the 
bank have done this for an individual? Whether we conclude that 
organizations are trusted more than individuals, or that they simply 
operate on a much larger scale, it is clear that the havoc caused when 
organizations are used36 outside the law far exceeds anything pro-
34. The effect of inter-district variation did not figure importantly in the larger sample in 
part because of the close relationship between crime category and judicial district. 
35. Organization at p=.0002, occupation at p=.0001. 
36. In the two cases just cited, as in most of our "organizational" offenses, crimes are not 
really committed by organizations, but are instead wrongs committed by individuals who use 
an organization as a base for illegal activity. 
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duced by unaffiliated actors. 
Magnitude of monetary loss is only one measure of consequence. 
An examination of the targets of white-collar crime provides an-
other. Was the victim an organization, such as the bank in an em-
bezzlement case or the government in a tax fraud? Or has some 
combination of organizations and individuals, or only individuals, 
been injured? When "real people" are hurt, trial judges often feel 
that a more serious violation has occurred. 37 It is therefore worth 
examining the targets chosen by our three types of off enders. We do 
that in Table 7. 
Table 7 
'Iype of Victim 
Individual Occupational Organizational 
Offenders Offenders Offenders Total 
Only Organizations 390 280 191 861 
(95.1%) (87.8%) (50.9%) 
Organizations and Individuals, 20 39 184 243 
Only Individuals (4.9%) (12.2%) (49.1%) 
Total 410 319 371 1104 
Perhaps the first finding we should recognize is that most victims 
of white-collar crime are organizations (including that largest of all 
organizations, the federal government). Just as the organizational 
form allows the commission of larger offenses, so organizations have 
more resources to be stolen, and in that sense are more appropriate 
targets for large-scale economic crime. It has also been suggested 
that organizations may be less able to defend themselves against 
criminal predation, again increasing the likelihood that they will be 
victimized. 38 Beyond this the nature of the target of white-collar 
crime is sharply related to the type of offender. If the off ender is an 
individual, or an individual working through an occupational role, 
the victim is almost certain to be an organization. As Table 6 shows, 
ninety-five percent of 410 individual offenders acted against organi-
zational victims, as did eighty-eight percent of those using occupa-
tion in the commission of their crime. Individuals (as well as 
aggregations of organizations and individuals) are most often victim-
37. For further detail on the study, see Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the While• 
Collar Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 4 (1980). This conclusion is drawn from an interview 
study of the perspectives of federal court judges on the sentencing of white-collar versus com-
mon crime defendants. 
38. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 8. On organizations as victims generally, see Reiss, Forward: 
Towards a Revitalization of Theory and Research on Victimization by Crime, 72 J. CRIM. L. AND 
CRIMINOLOGY 704 (1981). 
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ized by organizational offenders. A land fraud where individual vic-
tims lose their savings by investing in worthless property is a good 
ex:ample. Thus, not only are organizational off enders more likely to 
have committed much larger crimes in a monetary sense, they are 
also more likely to have victimized individuals, who are presump-
tively less able to recover from losses sustained. 
That organizational crimes are regarded as more serious is sup-
ported by two further pieces of evidence. The first concerns the max-
imum "exposure time" that our convicted felons could have served 
for their offenses. This measure reflects in part the number of counts 
for which defendants were separately charged, as well as the maxi-
mum penalties that Congress has established for each offense. The 
maximum exposure time for individual defendants averaged four 
years and three months. For occupational and organizational de-
fendants, the average was five years, two months and five years, 
three months, respectively. When we looked at our subset of four 
crimes to remove some of the offense-specific effects, the mean expo-
sure time was five years, two months for individuals, six years and 
one month for occupational defendants, and six years and eight 
months for organizational defendants. Legislative judgment and ju-
dicial action, as well as actual defendant behavior, thus give strong 
evidence that organizational offenses are more menacing than occu-
pational or individual crimes. 
C. The Nature ef the .Defendants 
Since organizational offenders commit offenses of greater dura-
tion, sophistication, magnitude, and perceived seriousness, one 
might imagine that they are to white-collar crime what the profes-
sional criminal is to blue-collar crime: namely, persons who have 
specialized in crime as a way of life. If so, we might expect to find 
that they have longer prior criminal records, and that they come 
from more deprived social backgrounds than the other defendants in 
our sample. Precisely the opposite is true. Because this Article seeks 
primarily to describe differences in the nature of the offense and its 
consequences, we will not examine in detail the disparities in defend-
ants' social and criminal backgrounds. A summary portrait, how-
ever, includes the following main features: 
(1) Organizational offenders are far less likely than their indi-
vidual counterparts to have prior criminal records. The individual 
defendants had· on average 3.4 prior arrests; the organizational of-
fenders averaged slightly more than one half of one arrest, with the 
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occupational offenders in between, but much closer to the organiza-
tional defendants. 
(2) When organizational defendants did have prior records, 
their most serious prior convictions were much less important than 
those of individual defendants.39 
{3) Although the average educational level for the total sample 
was quite high, it was about two years higher for organizational de-
fendants than for individual ones, with occupational off enders pre-
cisely in between. (The mean years of education were: individuals, 
12.2; occupational defendants, 13.2; organizational defendants, 14.0). 
(4) Organizational defendants were significantly older, averag-
ing forty-seven years for the total sample, as compared to forty years 
for the individual defendants.40 
(5) On two different but related measures of social status, one 
reflecting occupational status, and the other the exemplary character 
or "impeccability" of the defendant's prior conduct, organizational 
defendants were again better positioned than their individual coun-
terparts. They occupied higher positions when judged against stan-
dard occupational prestige ratings, and their prior conduct and 
community reputation looked much more "impeccable" than those 
of individual off enders. 41 On both measures, defendants who used 
occupation fell between individual and organizational defendants, 
though they were far closer to the latter. 
(6) Perhaps because of the traits just described, probation of-
ficers were more likely to give a positive characterization of the com-
munity reputations of organizational off enders in PSis, than to so 
characterize the reputations of occupational or individual offenders. 
Such representations were made for fewer than ten percent of the 
individual defendants and fifteen percent of the occupational de-
fendants, but appeared in the reports of twenty-three percent of the 
organizational defendants. 
All of this suggests, then, that a portion of the organizational de-
fendant's advantage accrues not through his organizational affilia-
tion per se, but because the defendants' stature lends credibility to 
their claims. Occupational and organizational status tend to go to-
39. The coding scheme for most serious prior convictions was based upon New York's 
Penal Code, with minor additions for various federal offenses. There is a grading of offenses 
from misdemeanors through low, moderate and high felonies. 
40. Here again there are offense-specific results. Because tax offenders tend to be older 
than embezzlers, our "occupational" category had a lower mean age (35) than the individual 
category when we examined the total sample. In the restricted sample, the numbers fell neatly 
into place: an average of36 years for individual defendants, 41 years for occupational defend-
ants, and 44 years for organizational criminals. 
41. See note 31, supra. 
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gether in our society - the stockbroker, for example; is also vice-
president of the firm and the lawyer is also general counsel to the 
corporation. This combination of organizational status and occupa-
tional position facilitates the theft of vastly greater sums of money 
than in the case of almost any other kind of crime, white-collar or 
not. Perhaps it is precisely the honorific status that we associate with 
the higher positions in social life - a reward for achievement and 
upstanding conduct - that enables the few in such positions who 
commit more serious crimes to gain so greatly from them. 
D. Sanctions and Legal Processing 
In a related paper on the sentencing of white-collar offenders, we 
note that the first and most important decision a sentencing judge 
makes is whether the defendant will be imprisoned.42 We attempt 
here to trace the major correlates of that decision. Act-related vari-
ables such as dollar victimization, sophistication, geographic spread, 
and seriousness of the offense, as measured by maximum exposure to 
imprisonment, are significantly related to the decision to incarcerate. 
So are a number of actor-related variables: the social status of the 
defendant, as measured by Duncan socioeconomic index scores ( a 
positive relationship), our measure of impeccability (the more im-
peccable, the less likely is incarceration), the number of previous ar-
rests, and the most serious prior conviction. In addition, some of the 
variation in incarceration can be explained by the statutory offense 
category itself, by the district of conviction, and most important, by 
the sex of the defendant (women are much less likely to be impris-
oned than men). 
These various factors do not permit clear prediction of sentenc-
ing patterns for organizational versus individual and occupational 
offenders. On the one hand, the greater magnitude and sophistica-
tion of organizational offenders' crimes and their concomitant higher 
act-related variable scores should point to a greater rate of incarcera-
tion. But organizational offenders' actor-related variable scores, es-
pecially those relating to impeccability and prior criminal history, 
are lower than those of individual or occupational off enders, sug-
gesting that they will be put behind bars less frequently. So perhaps 
it is not surprising to find that differences in the rate of incarceration 
among the categories of offenders were miniscule, especially between 
organizational and individual defendants. Forty-eight percent of the 
42. See Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and 
Reality, forthcoming in theAmerican Sociological Review, for a fuller description. (on file with 
the Michigan Law Review). 
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individual defendants, thirty-eight percent of the occupational de-
fendants, and forty-six percent of the organizational defendants 
served some time in jail or prison. It would thus appear that the 
greater severity of organizational defendants' crimes was offset at 
time of sentencing by a more upright record of prior conduct. This 
interpretation receives added support when it is recognized that the 
probation officer's evaluative assessments, as reported in the PSI, 
gave an edge to those defendants who could boast occupational or 
organizational affiliation. It is also consistent with another relevant 
fact: organizational defendants were about four times as likely to 
have a supporting letter in their file from som~one in the community. 
Finally, while only two thirds of the individual defendants enjoyed 
private counsel, over ninety percent of the organizational defendants 
were so represented. Privately retained lawyers may be more effec-
tive in keeping their clients from behind bars than appointed 
counsel. 
For organizational defendants who were imprisoned, however, 
the greater severity of their crimes had an impact. Among all incar-
cerated offenders, the average length of sentence for the individual 
defendants was nearly fifteen months. It was about the same -
fourteen and a half months - for occupational defendants, but was 
twenty-four and a half months for organizational criminals.43 It can-
not be claimed, therefore, that defendants who used an organiza-
tional "cover'' were given short, merely symbolic prison sentences. 
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The bulk of this Article has tried to establish that persons who 
commit offenses under the aegis of an organization are able thereby 
to commit crimes of greater sophistication, complexity, and magni-
tude. In the remainder of this Article, we will speculate on what it is 
about the organizational form that produces such differences in take, 
and also consider possible social policy consequences that might flow 
from this way of looking at white-collar crime. 
But before dealing with various substantive interpretations, we 
must consider the possibility that the main results are, in effect, an 
artifact of law enforcement procedures. The organizational offenses 
43. The 14½ month figure for occupational defendants does not include one fellow who 
was committed to the custody of the Attorney-General for observation and study pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 4208b (now§ 4205c), which requires that the maximum sentence of imprisonment 
prescribed by law be imposed, at least temporarily, until a study providing "more detailed 
information as a basis for determining the sentence" is obtained. That defendant was given 17 
consecutive five-year sentences; the sentencing project never learned whether the 85-year term 
was later reduced. 
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in our sample, it could be argued, are of large magnitude because 
those are the ones it pays to detect and prosecute. If organization 
provides effective cover for offenses, then only the largest will war-
rant the heavy investigative and prosecutorial resources that it takes 
to get convictions. We would then be comparing a more representa-
tive sample of individual offenses with a very special sample of orga-
nizational ones, and much of the difference in magnitude reported 
above would be explained by this fact. This explanation is consistent 
with "labeling theory" in sociology, and with some of the known 
facts about complex white-collar illegality. 
Though the argument cannot be dismissed, it really cuts both 
ways. If organizational crimes are more complicated, more difficult 
to ferret out and prove, then the more complex and problematic they 
become, the less likely it should be that they will come to the atten-
tion of enforcement personnel, be thoroughly investigated, or be 
prosecuted to successful conclusion after indictment. Our results 
may therefore underestimate differences between organizational and 
other kinds of white-collar crime. The simple fact is that we really 
don't know, in the case of common crime, simple white-collar crime, 
or complex white-collar crime what the relationship is between the 
magnitude of the take and the likelihood of getting caught. We see 
no reason in principle for that relationship to differ greatly across 
types of crime, and we rather imagine that in both simpler and more 
complex offenses law enforcement officials must trade off their esti-
mated likelihood of a conviction against the magnitude of the take. 
The same felt need to maintain a winning record, to favor cases that 
will conclude expeditiously with negotiated pleas of guilt, will obtain 
regardless of the form illegality takes. In any event, even though 
there may be some diminution of effect if the "enforcement artifact" 
argument is valid, we doubt very much that it would entirely wash 
away differences of the magnitude reported earlier in this Article. 
We thus feel the findings still warrant interpretation. 
Perhaps it is simply a question of scale. Just as famed heist-man 
Willy Sutton robbed banks because "that's where the money is," our 
defendants might use the organizational form because it yields large 
sums. Business organizations operate on a grander scale than indi-
viduals. The management of a chain of supermarkets, for example, 
will be perceived as having a legitimate need for larger bank loans 
than a mom and pop grocery store. Similarly, while there is a plausi-
ble upper limit to the number of Medicaid claims that a doctor prac-
ticing individually can possibly handle, when claims are submitted 
in the name of a clinic, it is harder to determine what that upper 
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limit might be. Scale also means broader geographic reach. An or-
ganization can sell its dry oil wells in many different cities at once; a 
lone con-man can concentrate on only a relatively few victims at a 
single time. Just as economies of scale permit a big organization to 
pro.fit legitimately from its size, so other attributes of scale facilitate 
the commission of large-scale illegalities. 
We imagine that a phenomenological feature operates here; too 
- persons view organizations as more substantial, more solid, more 
secure than individuals, and thus they may be less attentive to the 
risks of being duped or done-in.44 Even when this greater reservoir 
of faith in the organization does not exist a priori, the fine art of 
impression management may serve the organization equally well. A 
firm's offices may be decorated with the accouterments of success -
plush carpeting, large desks, and fine antiques - even though the 
company's product is virtually worthless. Symbols of success need 
not be physical. We learned of one instance in which a corrupt or-
ganization was able to delay its downfall by visibly playing up its use 
of a major investment banking firm. The organization must be all 
right, the public was led to perceive, if a leading firm was negotiating 
its bank loans. All the more so when, as in our other cases, the indi-
viduals acting on behalf of the organization are likely to present ex-
emplary backgrounds. 
In short, the organizational form itself, and public perceptions 
warped by image-making, combine to give the organization a height-
ened sense of legitimacy. This legitimacy attaches, we believe, 
whether the organization is designed, as in so many of our cases, to 
receive money from commercial enterprises or federal funding 
sources in response to false submissions, or whether it seeks to in-
duce private individuals and other organizations to invest in or buy 
products at inflated prices.· Just as the organizational form has facili-
tated economic and technological development on a scale far beyond 
that achieved by individuals, so that form has permitted illegal gains 
of a magnitude that men and women acting alone would find hard to 
attam. 
Even if the organizational form does not protect against getting 
caught, it may so delay the process that the magnitude of offense 
continues to grow. We have the strong impression that the profes-
sional norms that protect lawyer-client confidences also protect rela-
tionships among those of accountants, investment banking firms and 
44. Indeed, one might guess that the corporate form, in particular, has become so familiar 
a way of doing business that its absence might be some sort of warning sign. The advantages 
of incorporation are so obvious that one who proceeds without them might be thought igno• 
rant or foolish - not a good bet for a loan, investment, or as a business collaborator. 
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others involved in large financial transactions, and are thus likely to 
delay if not entirely inhibit the reporting of wrongdoing. The same 
features that give organizations initial credibility with individuals 
shield them from overly hasty complaint or investigation. Concerted 
ignorance on the part of original offenders may be matched by that 
among those professionals most likely to be drawn close to the activ-
ity in question.45 
If all these advantages accrue to the individual who uses the or-
ganizational form for illegal gain, why isn't there even more crime 
committed with the organization as weapon? Part of the explanation 
is that large pro.fits may be made through legitimate organizational 
activity. For whatever advantages organization provides, it remains 
the case that illegal behavior is found more often in newer,46 
smaller,47 less profitable48 organizations on the margins of more cen-
tral business networks.49 In part for this reason, we doubt the capac-
ity of increased penalties alone to have much influence on the kind 
of behavior we are studying. Some defendants, to be sure, act on the 
basis of a carefully weighed cost-benefit analysis. Others see no al-
ternative to a desperate financial situation, and many doubt that they 
will be caught. 
This leads us to believe that more thought should be given to 
alternative mechanisms of control. Is it possible, for example, to de-
velop better warning signs that would indicate when a company is in 
financial trouble and, therefore, more likely to adopt illegal solutions 
to its problems? Given the power of the organizational form, should 
we create more windows into the organization so that outsiders can 
see more clearly what insiders are doing? Can we make better use. of 
the accountants and lawyers whose presence lends legitimacy to or-
ganizational conduct? Maybe we can predict under what circum-
stances organizations will be more likely to violate the law. Perhaps 
more sophisticated indicators can be developed, allowing regulatory 
and other enforcement workers to focus all-too-limited investigative 
45. On the social construction of cover-up, see Katz, Concerted Ignorance, 8 URBAN ,LIFE 
295 (1979). 
46. S. Shapiro, Detecting Illegalities: A Perspective on the Control of Securities Violations 
(1980) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, Yale University); and P. 
Yeager, The Politics of Corporate Social Control: The Federal Response to Industrial Water 
Pollution (1981) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of 
Wisconsin). 
47. S. Shapiro, supra note 46. 
48. Staw and Szwajkowski, The Scarcity-Munfjicence Component of Organizational Envi-
ronments and the Commission of Illegal Acts, 20 Ao. SCI. Q. 345 (1975); M. CLINARD & P. 
YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980). 
49. Kriesberg, National Security and Conduct in the Steel Industry, 34 Soc. FORCES 268 
(1956). 
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resources in areas where they will be most effective. The IRS audits 
1 
tax returns, individual and corporate, with a relatively refined sense 
of the chances of finding attempted evasion. Can agencies charged 
with the control of organizational wrongdoing accomplish the same 
thing when they review reports of compliance with environmental 
pollution permits, offering statements, and the like? 
Before new control strategies are investigated, time might well be 
spent considering the impact of regulation on organizational illegal-
ity. Although crimes of great magnitude can continue month after 
month, often accompanied by missed opportunities for detection, we 
cannot estimate the net effects of changed rules or administrative 
procedures. Perhaps we now have the "right" amount of crime com-
mitted via the organizational form, in the sense that any further sur-
veillance or control efforts might reduce organizations' capacity to 
grow and respond to new opportunities. The dollars that would go 
into internal management or external control might be better spent 
on other activities. The sheer magnitude, however, of the losses 
caused by organizational misbehavior is enough to suggest the 
contrary. 
We began with an announced concern for the effect of occupa-
tion and organization on white-collar criminal activity. We have 
shown that although a criminal acting in an occupational role does 
enhance his "take," it is the combination of occupation and organi-
zation that yields the greatest payoffs. Occupation and organization 
are to the world of white-collar crime what the knife and gun are to 
street crimes. And just as we now have research that explores the 
consequences of different types of weapons for common crime, so 
may we anticipate a more detailed examination of the use of the 
organizational form in w~te-collar illegality. The areas for research 
are fertile. What are the most crucial features of organization for the 
commission of specific white-collar offenses? Can we develop the 
organizational equivalent of the ballistics unit for common crime to 
identify readily features that link characteristic attributes of organi-
zational style to particular offenses? These and related questions are 
prompted by viewing the organization as the white-collar criminal's 
most powerful weapon. 
